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MARRIAGE AS A BAD BUSINESS DEAL: DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY
ON DIVORCEt
MICHAEL D. BAYLES*
While reasonableness is rarely the main ingredient in the decision to
marry, the law should not make the choice to marry unreasonable
per se.I
A LTHOUGH many factors can be involved in the reasonableness
.1 of marriage, this Essay focuses on only one-the financial set-
tlement in the event of divorce. Recent changes in divorce law and in
demographic patterns of marriage and divorce are making marriage
an unreasonable decision for an increasingly large segment of the pop-
ulation. If marriage is to become an economically reasonable decision
for persons affected by these changes, divorce laws pertaining to fi-
nancial settlements need to be revised.
Ironically, the recent changes in divorce law were intended to cor-
rect inequities in the law. While the changes may produce more equity
in divorces that conform to past patterns of marriage and divorce,
they unfortunately tend to produce inequity in those that conform to
more modern patterns.
Recent changes in laws concerning financial settlements upon di-
vorce concern what property is to be divided, how that property is to
be divided, and if and how much alimony or maintenance is to be
awarded. A pervasive trend has been to increase the property to be
divided. One aspect of this trend has been the classification of more
property as marital or community and, therefore, less as nonmarital
or separate.2 Another aspect has been the expansion of the category of
t The Florida State University Law Review publishes this Essay as a non-traditional legal
piece. The Law Review wishes to provide a forum for the ideas expressed within this Essay, but
does not guarantee the substantive accuracy of the sociological and legal claims presented herein.
* Professor of Philosophy, Florida State University; Adjunct Professor of Law, Spring
1989, Florida State University College of Law; B.A., 1962, University of Illinois; M.A., 1963,
University of Missouri; Ph.D., 1967, Indiana University; Fellow in Law and Philosophy, 1974-
75, Harvard Law School.
1. H.D. KRAUSE, FAmIy LAW IN A NUTSHELL 365 (2d ed. 1986).
2. Some states permit courts to distribute both marital or community property and sepa-
rate property. See Freed & Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 21 FAM. L.Q.
417, 453-54, Table IV (1988); see also L.J. GOLDEN, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY
§ 2.02 (1983).
96 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
property to include, for example, unvested pensions.' Additionally,
there has been a decrease in the importance of marital fault to the
division of property upon divorce. 4 Finally, alimony as a life-long
award to a dependent spouse has generally been replaced with short-
term "rehabilitative" alimony to enable a dependent spouse to ac-
quire job training and become economically independent.'
During the 1970's, partly in response to the drive for equality of the
sexes, equal division of property and diminution of alimony were em-
phasized. An equal division of property supposedly reflects the equal-
ity of the sexes, while alimony is often considered demeaning and is,
in practice, usually not fully collected. Recently, however, equal divi-
sion of property has been viewed less favorably. 6 To provide an equal
division of property, the family home may have to be sold, sometimes
leaving a spouse having custody of children with inadequate housing.
Moreover, one spouse, usually the husband, may have a higher earn-
ing capacity. Consequently, postdivorce economic equality and, thus,
sexual equality, does not necessarily result.7
Recent divorce law changes, as well as some suggestions for further
changes, have been based on the most prevalent past pattern of mar-
riage and divorce. This traditional pattern was of couples marrying at
a young age, the wife staying home to raise a family, and the couple
divorcing after a substantial number of years. However, two other
patterns of marriage are becoming increasingly significant. One prom-
inent pattern involves the rise in the number of second and subsequent
marriages.' These marriages naturally occur at a later age than first
marriages. 9 Moreover, one or both of the participants in these mar-
riages may have been through a financially difficult divorce and,
3. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Campa, 89 Cal. App. 3d 113, 152 Cal. Rptr. 362 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1979), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980)
(pension); Evans v. Evans, 96 Mich. App. 328, 296 N.W.2d 248 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (social
security); Elliott v. Elliott, 274 N.W.2d 75 (Minn. 1978) (social security); see also M.A. GLEN-
DON, THE NEW FAmLY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 67 (1981).
4. Freed & Walker, supra note 2, at 462-63, Table V, 467.
5. L.J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 163-64 (1985); see also H.H. CLARK, THE
LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 175 (2d ed. 1987).
6. See, e.g., L.J. WEITZMAN, supra note 5, at 105-09.
7. See id. at 378 ("For without equality in economic resources, all other 'equality' is illu-
sory.").
8. In 1970, 31.4% of marriages taking place in the United States involved at least one
previously married partner. By 1975, this percentage had risen to 39.90, and by 1980, to 43.8%.
By 1985, this percentage had risen to 45.7%. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 85, Table 129 (109th ed. 1989) [hereinafter STATIS-
TICAL ABSTRACT].
9. In 1985 the median age at first marriage was 23.0 years for women and 24.8 years for
men. The median age for divorced people remarrying was 32.7 years for women and 36.0 years
for men. Id. at 86, Table 130.
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therefore, may be more apt to consider the financial aspects of mar-
riage than people entering their first marriage. The other growing pat-
tern is simply marriage at an older age.' 0 Because marriages that fit
into both of these patterns involve older people, it is more likely that
both partners will enter the marriage with established jobs or careers
in which they expect to continue. In both of these newer patterns,
spouses are more likely to bring significant property into the marriage
than in the traditional pattern.
This Essay focuses on the law governing the division of financial
assets and concludes that the law, as it now exists, can make mar-
riages that fit into the newer patterns unwise and unfair. Because both
partners in such marriages are more likely to have established employ-
ment or careers, the decrease in alimony awards is less significant. Ad-
ditionally, the classification of property as marital and nonmarital,
together with the current method of distribution, is unreasonable and
unfair when applied to marriages that fit into these new patterns and
that end in divorce.
A significant minority of states classify all property as marital.
Even in the majority of states which distinguish between marital and
nonmarital property, the classification is likely to be unfair in mar-
riages conforming to these newer patterns. New ways of treating pen-
sions on divorce also contribute to making such marriages financially
unwise. The principles of distribution do not correct and may exacer-
bate the problems that arise from the classification of property.
I. MARRIAGE AS AN ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP
Divorce law's purposes can significantly affect its contours. Divorce
law, especially as it relates to property distribution, can be assumed to
10. In 1975, 65.3% of people who got married in the United States were 24 years old or
younger. By 1980, this percentage had dropped to 58.2%. By 1985, people 24 or younger ac-
counted for only 48.3% of people married in the United States. While these percentages were
dropping, the percentage of people who got married between the ages of 25 and 34 rose from
21.1% in 1975, to 28% in 1980, and to 34.1% in 1985. Likewise, the percentage of people who
got married between the ages of 35 and 44 rose from 6.7% in 1975, to 7.807 in 1980, and to
11.1% in 1985. Id. at 85, Table 128.
If, as argued, the divorce law discourages marriage, one might wonder why marriage rates
continue to be so high. Four possibilities suggest themselves. First, the rates would be even
higher were it not for the divorce laws. Second, the effect is not so much discouragement of
marriage but discouragement of marriage outside of one's economic class. Thus, divorce law
affects who people marry but not whether they marry. Third, economic considerations are not
the only factor involved in determining the overall reasonableness of marriage, so when other
factors are considered, marriage might still be reasonable. Fourth, perhaps some decisions to
marry are simply not rational or reasonable; whom one loves does not seem to be rationally
based. Whatever the case may be, the law need not and should not contribute to marriage being
economically unreasonable.
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have at least three purposes. First, the law should provide a sharp and
clean break so that the ex-spouses can get on with their lives with min-
imal personal and financial contact. Of course, where there are chil-
dren, continued contact regarding them should occur. Second, the law
should have predictable results so that spouses can plan for the conse-
quences of divorce. Third, the law should be fair," since fair laws
tend to diminish disputes.12 Basic to these purposes is the concept that
marriage should not be discouraged by society.
The traditional concept of marriage underlying the law has both
moral and economic aspects. The moral aspect involves public recog-
nition and protection of an intimate sharing and loving relationship
that provides a setting deemed desirable for child rearing. 3 Histori-
cally, this moral aspect was reflected in the law by the prohibition of
adultery, by fault-based divorce, and by the distinction between legiti-
mate and illegitimate children. With the trend against legal enforce-
ment of morality and the demise of fault-based divorce, the moral
aspect has become less significant, especially for divorce.
The historical economic aspect of marriage was an identity in the
husband. That concept has been replaced by one of an (equal?) eco-
nomic partnership. 4 Three principles underlie the economic partner-
ship concept of marriage.' 5 First, the principle of "all efforts" is that
each spouse will contribute all time and effort to the marital unit. Sec-
ond, the "enablement" principle is that homemaking enables the in-
come producer's activities. Third, the "sharing" principle is that
spouses expect to share in the financial fortunes of the marital unit.
The reasonableness and fairness of current laws for second 16 and late
marriages that result in divorce depend largely on the appropriateness
of these principles.
The partnership conception of marriage omits some considerations
relevant to the total well-being of the marital unit and its partners.
For example, in the partnership model there is no consideration of
psychological well-being or of love and commitment. Although the
principles of "all efforts" and "enablement" are meant to include in-
tangible as well as tangible aspects, the concept is of a semi-arm's-
11. Whatever "fair" is.
12. Of course, the public interest in fairness transcends dispute minimization.
13. See Bayles, Marriage, Love and Procreation, in PHILOSOPHY AND SEX 130, 138-42 (R.
Baker & F. Elliston 2d ed. 1984).
14. See H.H. CLARK, supra note 5, at 194.
15. Krauskopf, Classifying Marital and Separate Property-Combinations and Increase in
Value of Separate Property, 89 W. VA. L. REv. 997, 1019 (1987).
16. The expression "second marriage" is used throughout to describe any marriage after
the first.
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length relationship and does not represent a full conception of mar-
riage, especially as viewed by participants. Nonetheless, the law prob-
ably cannot adequately handle a full concept of marriage. The
following criticisms reveal that the partnership model is inadequate
even as a concept of the economic aspects of marriage.
The "all efforts" principle is both psychologically and economically
inappropriate. The once popular notion that couples should share eve-
rything no longer seems realistic. To maintain their separate identities
and independence, people now expect to have some separate and indi-
vidual activities. This is especially true of persons marrying for a sec-
ond time or at a late age. They have significant past lives as separate
individuals. Psychological identity and independence often depend on
financial independence. Financial independence can rest on individual
income or separate property brought to the marriage that one may
expect to manage and retain. If both spouses are working, they often
think of at least some of their income as separate; not all efforts are
devoted to the marital unit. 7
The "enablement" principle seems more plausible. Surely, one
spouse managing all homemaking chores enables the other spouse to
devote more time to producing income." However, this principle as-
sumes that the income producing spouse can devote more time to pro-
ducing income and that the time spent performing homemaking
chores comes from time spent producing income. Neither of these as-
sumptions is necessarily true. People in hourly paid jobs cannot uni-
laterally increase their hours of work, and salaried workers are not
directly paid for overtime. Moreover, homemaking activites usually
decrease recreational time rather than work time. The "enablement"
principle becomes even less plausible if it is interpreted to mean that
the enablement function's value increases in proportion to the income
produced.19 If one simply values homemaking time as the cost of hir-
ing someone to do the work, then of course it does not increase pro-
portional to the income produced. If one thinks of it as saving the
income producer time, then it would be proportional. However, this
view is based on the mistaken assumption that homemaking time is
17. In roughly one-third of marriages where both spouses work, they view their earnings as
individual, not family, income. M.A. GLENDON, supra note 3, at 65 n.55.
18. I have found that I have more time for professional activities when single, even per-
forming household chores myself, than when married. The loss of time when married stems
from activities that might be considered their own reward-for both partners. These self-reward-
ing aspects are not considered in the partnership model, but as each partner benefits, they do not
affect the economic aspects.
19. See, e.g., Krauskopf, supra note 15, at 998.
19891
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
taken from time that would be used to produce income rather than
from time that would be used for recreation.
Although this proportionality interpretation of the "enablement"
principle is incorrect, a concept of the "sharing" principle based on
proportionality is possible. A general formula for each spouse's share
of marital assets is S = SfxT, where T is the total of marital assets and
Sf is one spouse's fractional share. Thus, even if a spouse's activity is
homemaking, assuming Sf remains constant, the value of that
spouse's share increases in proportion to the total. However, the gen-
eral formula does not indicate what fraction of the total marital assets
belongs to a spouse. That is, the division need not be in proportion to
the amount each contributed or produced. Spouses probably have dif-
ferent conceptions about appropriate shares, and the expectations of a
particular couple might change over time. These expectations cannot
be the sole basis for determining what the law should be, for they are
shaped partially by what the law is. Consequently, while a minority of
states divide marital property equally, a large majority distribute it
equitably, which allows for unequal shares. 20
II. MARITAL AND NONMARITAL PROPERTY
Partners' expectations of the share of assets they will receive on di-
vorce can reasonably be understood to depend in part on the amount
of property they bring to the marriage. In first marriages at a young
age, neither partner usually has much property. However, that is of-
ten not the case in second and late marriages. For people contemplat-
ing such marriages, marriage can be viewed as economically
unreasonable. Consider an example of each of these trends. Person A,
who is considering a second marriage, owns a car, furniture, and a
house valued at $85,000 with a remaining mortgage of $50,000. Per-
son B, who is contemplating a first marriage, is thirty years old, has a
full-time job that pays $28,000 a year, owns a car and 135 shares in
the employer's company bought under an employees' stock purchase
program, and has $5600 in a mutual fund. Suppose that each is con-
templating marriage to a person who, though employed, has an in-
come some $5000 to $10,000 less per year and no significant property
other than an automobile.
A and B can both lose a significant amount of their property should
their marriages end in divorce in, say, five years. Crucial to this po-
tential loss is the classification of property as marital or nonmarital.
In a significant minority of states, no distinction is made between
20. See Freed & Walker, supra note 2, at 453-54, Table IV.
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marital and nonmarital property.2 In these "hotchpot" states, the
judge dividing the assets presumably considers how much property
each person brought to the marriage. 22 However, that is only a pre-
sumption, and the judge need not do so. Consequently, both A and B
risk losing a portion of the property they bring to their marriages if
the marriages end in divorce. In this respect, marriage is economically
unreasonable and unfair for A and B. 23
Community property and common law states that distinguish be-
tween marital and nonmarital property face similar problems. 24 In the
majority of states which make such a distinction, property possessed
prior to marriage and property acquired by gift or inheritance during
marriage are normally classified as nonmarital. Moreover, except in
one state, 25 the classification of property as marital or nonmarital
largely depends on the source of funds expended to buy the property.
In these states, A's and B's separate property seems secure. Not so!
The doctrine of transmutation provides several ways by which the
actions of one or both spouses can cause separate property to become
marital property.2 6 First, property can be transmuted by gift or by
placing it in joint title.217 For example, suppose B sells a few shares of
the mutual fund to purchase a stereo television as a Christmas gift for
B's spouse. In some states, the gift becomes the recipient spouse's sep-
arate property. However, other states explicitly except interspousal
gifts from being separate property, in which case the gift becomes
marital property. 28 Similarly, suppose that after a few years A and A's
spouse decide to sell their house and purchase a larger one. In many
states, mortgage lenders require that the new house be taken in joint
title. In this case, the house becomes marital property, and A's previ-
ously separate equity is converted to marital property.
Second, suppose A avoids placing the house in joint title. It still
could be readily transmuted to marital property through the doctrine
of commingling. A's income is marital property. If this income is used
to make mortgage payments, marital and nonmarital property has
been commingled and the nonmarital property is therefore possibly
21. See id.; L.J. GOLDEN, supra note 2, at § 2.02.
22. See C. FOOTE, R.J. LEvy & F.E.A. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS iN FAW.Y LAW 658
(3d ed. 1985).
23. See M.A. GLENDON, supra note 3, at 63.
24. H.H. CLARK, supra note 5, at 177-78. Actually, the common law states have often in-
corporated community property doctrines. See id.
25. See Freed & Walker, supra note 2, at 453-54, Table IV, 455 (In Mississippi the classifi-
cation of property depends solely upon the state of title to that property.).
26. See generally Krauskopf, supra note 15, at 1002-09.
27. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter, 419 A.2d 1018, 1022 (Me. 1980).
28. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 61.075 (3)(a)(3) (Supp. 1988).
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subject to division upon divorce. 29 The same occurs if B purchases
more shares of stock under the employee plan or buys more shares of
the mutual fund. When marital property is combined with nonmarital
property, the resulting whole will usually be classified as part marital
and part separate property, the percentages depending upon the
source of the funds.30 Thus, if A had $35,000 worth of equity in the
house at the time of marriage, at least that much will remain A's sepa-
rate property.
A has not, however, avoided the possibility of having the equity at
marriage transmuted to marital property. A third form of transmuta-
tion occurs when property is used by the marital unit. Thus, if A and
A's spouse live in the house and use the furniture, this property can
become marital.3 ' With this version of transmutation, A's only
method of retaining the house as separate property is to refrain from
using it as the marital home. B, however, will avoid this form of
transmutation, because the stock and mutual fund are not "used" by
the marital unit.
There is another way A and B can find marriage financially disad-
vantageous. Suppose B's mutual fund is a high income bond fund
with the income re-invested. In some states, the income received from
separate property during marriage is marital property,3 2 so the shares
bought by re-investing are also marital. Similarly, if A rents the
house, the rental income is often marital property. Accordingly, if this
rental income is used to pay off the mortgage, that part of the equity
in the house becomes marital property. In short, if income from sepa-
rate property is marital property, separate property brought to a mar-
riage cannot increase due to re-investment of income.
A and B might still be able to increase the value of their separate
property; they might have capital gains. Whether this is so depends on
the principles used for dividing the appreciation in value between
commingled marital and nonmarital property. In some cases, appreci-
ation other than that caused by inflation is simply classified as marital
property.3 If this principle is employed, A and B will not retain as
separate any growth in the real value of their separate property.
29. In re Marriage of Marsden, 130 Cal. App. 3d 426, 181 Cal. Rptr. 910 (Cal. Ct. App.
1982); Sturgis v. Sturgis, 663 S.W.2d 375 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
30. See Krauskopf, supra note 15, at 1000.
31. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 61.075(3)(b)(3) (Supp. 1988) (Income from separate property
ceases to be separate if "treated, used, or relied upon . . . as a marital asset.").
32. See, e.g., H.H. CLARK, supra note 5, at 189; Krauskopf, supra note 15, at 1000; IDAHO
CODE § 32-906 (1983).
33. See, e.g., Sousley v. Sousley, 614 S.W.2d 942 (Ky. 1981) (appreciation in value treated
as income and divided).
MARRIAGE AS A BAD BUSINESS DEAL
Two other principles are often used, especially for private busi-
nesses, depending on whether the major source of funds invested in
the business is marital or nonmarital.3 4 If the primary source of in-
crease to separate property is the skill and activity of one spouse, such
increase will likely be categorized as marital property.35 If the primary
source of increase to separate property is independent of the marital
unit, then such increase will likely be categorized as separate property.
Thus, if A rents the house, the marital unit is entitled to reasonable
compensation for A's managerial effort. If B does nothing with the
shares of stock and does not re-invest dividends, then B might be able
to retain their full value as separate property, even if the shares appre-
ciate in value.16
The point is that A and B have little chance to do better than retain
as separate property the value they bring to marriage adjusted by in-
flation. At best, they can retain full appreciation of unmanaged as-
sets. At worst, the whole could become converted to marital property.
If their intended spouses have little property, no property, or property
of significantly less value, they are not entering the economic partner-
ship on equal terms. Without assurance that the division of marital
assets upon divorce will reflect their greater contributions, A and B
are faced with a bad business deal.
III. PENSIONS
Pension rights brought to marriage are separate property, but those
acquired during marriage are now generally considered marital prop-
erty. The distribution of marital pension rights upon divorce is com-
plex. Only a few points regarding possible unfavorable distributions
are mentioned here. Suppose CH and CW have approximately equal
incomes, but CW has a better pension plan because her employer con-
tributes more. Upon divorce, pensions acquired by both during their
marriage are treated as marital property. Suppose they are divided
equally. In this case, CW receives a smaller pension for the years of
marriage than she would receive if she had been single during those
years. But, one might say, this is appropriate if one assumes that mar-
riage is an equal partnership. Nonetheless, it is an unwise economic
decision to put more into a partnership than the other partner if assets
are to be divided equally. Moreover, the variety of pension plans and
34. See generally Krauskopf, supra note 15, at 1024-33.
35. Remember that any effort put into managing a business is, by the principle of all ef-
forts, a marital contribution.
36. See, e.g., In re Estate of Ney, 212 Cal. App. 2d 891, 28 Cal. Rptr. 442 (Cal. Ct. App.
1963); Cord v. Cord, 98 Nev. 210, 644 P.2d 1026 (1982).
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methods of valuing them render it difficult to be sure that one will not
lose simply by miscalculation of benefits.
IV. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Persons entering a second or late marriage with significantly more
property than their intended spouses are making a bad business deal.
All of the property they possessed before the marriage might be con-
sidered in the distribution of assets upon divorce. Some of their for-
merly separate property may become marital property, the income
from property retained as separate may be considered marital prop-
erty, and the appreciation in value of property retained as separate
may be considered marital property.
However, mere classification of property as marital does not neces-
sarily imply that one will lose it upon divorce. One might lose some of
such property in equal division states, but, even there, judges often
consider the source of the funds with which the property was pur-
chased. In states in which property is divided equitably, if one has an
equitable claim to a larger share of marital assets, that claim may be
recognized. The classification of assets as marital or separate, though,
is not the dispositive issue. Regardless of what property will be consid-
ered available for distribution, whether marriage is economically un-
wise depends crucially on how property is to be divided.
The problem with the current laws is the uncertainty of what will be
considered an equitable distribution. In effect, equitable distribution
is discretionary distribution.37 In some states, statutes provide courts
only general guidance with regard to the distribution of assets.38 In
other states, statutes require that certain factors be considered.3 9 These
factors include the length of the marriage, the age and health of the
parties, the occupations of the parties, the amounts and sources of
each party's income, the vocational skills and employability of each
party, and each party's contributions to, or dissipations of, the mari-
tal assets.40 No reasonably precise formula exists to determine what
distribution will result from the application of these factors. Some of
these factors pull in opposite directions. For example, contribution
supports a larger share for the person who brought greater assets into
the marriage or who has a higher income. Vocational skills and em-
ployability, on the other hand, can support a greater share for the
37. See M.A. GLENDON, supra note 3, at 63-64.
38. See, e.g., ALAsrA STAT. § 25.24.160 (Supp. 1988); MicH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 25.99
(West 1984).
39. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 61.075(1) (Supp. 1988).
40. For a more complete list, see Freed & Walker, supra note 2, at 465-66.
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person who has fewer vocational skills and is less employable, even
though that person probably contributed less to the marriage than did
the more highly skilled and employable spouse. In the final analysis,
one must marshal a large amount of data to support one's claim, and
then trust in judicial discretion.
If the preservation of formerly separate property upon divorce is
uncertain, then one can make an antenuptial agreement to provide
specific guidelines for the division of property upon divorce. 4' How-
ever, the validity of an antenuptial agreement is uncertain. 42 Indeed,
the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act merely cites an antenuptial
agreement as another factor for a judge to consider in the division of
the property. 43 Thus, the remedy for uncertainty is itself uncertain. 44
V. CONCLUSION
Second and late marriages are two growing patterns of marriage
and divorce. Persons entering such marriages are more likely to have
substantial financial assets than those marrying earlier in life. Divorce
law primarily regards marriage as an economic partnership. The un-
derlying principles of "all efforts," "enablement," and "sharing" are
questionable.
A party entering a marriage with substantially more assets than the
other party faces significant risks of losing those assets in the event of
divorce. In some states, no distinction is made between marital and
nonmarital property for purposes of distribution on divorce. Even if a
distinction is drawn, separate property can be transmuted into marital
property by joint title, use by the marital unit, and perhaps mere com-
mingling with marital property. Income from separate property is of-
ten marital, and the property's appreciation in value can become
mostly marital. In addition, one might lose some of the value of a
pension accrued during marriage. Consequently, marriage can be an
economically unreasonable decision for people with significant prop-
erty.
In the majority of states, equitable distribution upon divorce can
provide such a person a greater portion of the assets. However, vari-
ous principles compete, and several support giving a larger share to
the person who probably contributed less. The results depend on judi-
cial discretion and are uncertain. Antenuptial agreements might pro-
41. See Krauskopf, supra note 15, at 1034.
42. See, e.g., Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970); Mulford v. Mulford, 211 Neb.
747, 320 N.W.2d 470 (1982); Duncan v. Duncan, 652 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).
43. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DrvORcE ACT § 307(A), 9A U.L.A. 238 (1973).
44. Moreover, antenuptial agreements can involve significant legal expense.
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vide protection for assets brought to a marriage, but their validity is
sometimes risky, and even if valid they are not always decisive.
Consequently, many second and late marriages are bad business
deals. Considerable uncertainty exists about how marital property will
be distributed should divorce occur. The economic reasonableness of
marrying decreases, and marriage is thus discouraged. The uncertainty
undermines predictability of results, thus fostering disputes. The law's
fairness is also doubtful, at best depending on the discretion of
judges. As one scholar put it, "What person will enter a business or
professional partnership or joint venture if the only liquidation rule is
that a court will have discretion to make any order it thinks fit in
regard to all the money and property? ' ' 4 Finally, the economic part-
nership concept of marriage is misleading.
Financial assets possessed prior to marriage should not so readily be
considered a contribution to the marriage. Those assets, and their in-
come and increase in value, should normally remain nonmarital prop-
erty. They should become marital only if the owner makes an
affirmative act to contribute them to the marriage. Mere use of tangi-
ble assets such as a house or automobile should not count as such an
act. Use of income to purchase assets for joint use would be such an
act. If such assets are the primary source of income, such as a busi-
ness, then at least all income should be deemed marital. Unless
stronger protection is given to assets brought to a marriage as separate
property, many potential second and late marriages will be economi-
cally unwise and could be discouraged. The laws governing the divi-
sion of property upon divorce must be revised if the law is to
encourage, or at least not discourage, marriage.
45. Baxter, Family Law Reform in Ontario, 25 U. TORONTo L.J. 237, 261 (1975).
